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Abstract 
 
The role that the credit rating agencies have played during the last financial crisis put 
the focus on them. The aim of this work is to study their origin, their history and the 
arguments that drove them to accumulate the present institutional power. But we want 
to go beyond that, because their performance during the crisis shown that, despite the 
fact that they have institutional power and recognition, their methodology had failed. 
Along the following pages, we analyze this discordance between their role and their 
reliability. 
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Introduction 
 
Just after the subprime financial crisis, Packer and Tarashev (2011) analyzed the 
correlation between the ratings assessed by the credit rating agencies for a 
sample of sixty large internationally active banks and the banks’ subsequent 
reliance on the emergency measures taken. What they found was especially 
surprising, the correlation was clear but, nevertheless, it was positive: the 
higher rating, the higher the help required.  In this master thesis we analyze the 
role of credit rating agencies in economy, where they come from and how they 
really work. 
 
With this aim, we have structured this paper in three sections and concluding 
remarks. The first one is an introduction focused in credit rating agencies, their 
place in society, their origins and how they arrived to be what they are today. In 
the second section we go in depth in the way these agencies work, in the 
methodology they use. In order to do this, we focus in one of the many 
procedures they use, one that we consider among the most significant: the 
banks’ rating methodology.  Besides this, the sovereign creditworthiness rating 
is probably the other most relevant methodology, but we decided to center in 
the banks’ one given the evident fiasco it has been observed at the beginning of 
the crisis period. Thereby, in the third section we discuss what we believe are 
weaknesses in the banks’ rating procedure and why we think that, despite this, 
their role is, and probably will be, institutionally so strong. Finally, we close this 
master thesis with some concluding remarks. 
 
1. Rating Agencies: Role, history and function 
 
1.1 Role of Credit Rating Agencies     
 
Globalization has lead to an expansion of the capital markets, both in terms of 
widening the interactions around the world and the amount of capital invested. 
In this context, the governments and firms need liquidity, which is feed by 
external capital. Government and firms issue debt and bonds by selling them to 
private investors, obtaining by this way the necessary financial resources.  
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One of the main concerns of any lender is ascertain the capacity of the borrower 
to return the debt. For this purpose, the lender could collect his/her own 
information about the potential borrower as well as imposing contract 
agreements. But lenders could also seek for external advice from independent 
agencies. When investors lend the money by buying bonds, they expected that 
issuers –borrowers– repay the loan in the future with some interests. In this 
context, the Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) have become an important tool for 
determining ratings about the ability to pay back the debt that was contracted. 
The agencies claim that their rating provides an approximation of the 
willingness to pay back the debt following the terms of the contract. These 
agencies help by offering judgments that fulfil the asymmetric information 
between the issuers and the holders. Summarizing, the CRAs provides two 
main services: The first one is offering an independent indication of the ability 
of the issuer, either governments, financial or non-financial firms, to return the 
debt obligations. The second service provided is offering monitoring services by 
which they control the issuer’s performance and promote corrective actions to 
recover better rates (Boot et al. 2006). These companies prefer to call “opinions” 
to their judgements, by saying that their offered statements are opinions and 
not recommendations to purchase.1 At present, CRAs evaluate a huge amount 
of different products, such as sovereign ratings that governments emit to attract 
foreign investors, or structured products, which nowadays are key elements of 
financial markets.  
 
1.2  Capital markets without Credit Rating Agencies 
 
The business of assessing bonds quality by CRAs emerged at the beginning of 
the twentieth century. Before that time, bond and capital markets had already 
existed for at least three hundred years. Moreover, the previous last two 
centuries of these old capital markets could be considered global. Dutch 
investors had been buying government bonds for previous three centuries 
(Neal 1993), English investors had developed a modern financial system during 
the eighteenth century (Dickson 1967) and at the end of the same century the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 CRAs state that they emit “opinions” to claim they are publishers. By this way, they are 
protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution when are sued by investors 
who claim that the ratings of the agencies have affected negatively their decisions. 
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United States too (Sylla 1998); all of them without the existence of rating 
agencies. This historical perspective indicates that CRAs are not basic 
components of capital markets as their function has been previously 
accomplished by several other mechanisms (reviewed in Sylla 2002). The 
business of CRAs was born in the United States, and the American history 
could help to explain why these agencies appeared and succeeded. Before the 
rating agencies existed and appropriated the bond-rating market, lenders and 
borrowers got the credit information by different means: by credit-reporting 
agencies, by specialized financial press or by investment bankers. In some way, 
the CRAs innovation was the merge of these three institutional sources of 
information. 
 
Credit-Reporting Agencies 
By the 1830s, the need of expanding from local to wider transactions through 
the United States, encouraged businesspersons to get more information about 
the creditworthiness of other people. As the trading distances became larger, 
the merchants do not know personally their customers, and previous 
information channels such as letters of recommendation were not sufficient. 
This specialized service of provision of commercial information of individual 
costumers was carried out by the credit-reporting agencies, which gathered 
financial reliability of different businessman all over the United States. In 1857, 
John Bradstreet of Cincinnati published the first commercial reporting book. 
The Bradstreet companies merged in 1933 with the Dun Company, another 
important credit-reporting agency, to form the ‘Dun & Bradstreet’ firm. In 1962, 
this firm acquired the Moody’s Investor service, the oldest of the three big 
credit rating agencies. By this way, the closely related service of credit reporting 
and credit rating became merged under a single corporation service.  
 
The Specialized Business/Financial Press. 
In United States, railroad corporations became a huge business at the beginning 
of nineteenth century. As a result, a specialized publication, The American 
Railroad Journal, was launched in 1832. The journal suited the demands of 
investors when Henry Varnum Poor (1832) became its editor in 1849. During 
the period of Poor’s editorship, 1849-1862, the journal gathered systematic 
information about the propriety of railroads and related financial information. 
4 
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Several years later, Poor created a firm with his son that published an annual 
manual about operating statistics of the American railroad field. This book was 
considered as an authoritative source of information. In 1916, the Poor company 
itself entered into the credit rating business. 
 
Investment Bankers. 
The investment bankers acted as the financial intermediaries who were in 
charge of distributing the securities from railroad corporations, and put their 
reputation on the line in every transaction. They possessed privileged 
information that they shared with their investors. The power that banks had, 
and the increasing number of potential investors who desired to access to the 
same information as the bankers, led to the creation of new regulatory laws. At 
the 1930s, in United States was created a mandatory disclosure law of financial 
information for issuers of securities that reinforce the predominant role of the 
CRAs in detriment of investment bankers.  
 
1.3 History of Credit Rating Agencies 
 
1.3.1 Origin 
 
The origin of the CRAs is mainly explained by the large construction of 
railroads through the United States country during the nineteenth century and 
the beginning of the twentieth. The railroads corporations needed large 
amounts of capital, and the solution for financing the projects were the 
development of a huge market of bonds debt. The United States corporate bond 
market became a financial innovation, which later was spread to the rest of the 
world. In 1909, John Moody published the first ratings about railroad bonds. 
The Poor Company, which was already specialized in financial press, entered in 
1916 into the bond-rating sector. In 1941, the Poor’s company merged with 
Standard Statistics firm, another firm that have been already in the rating 
sector, to create the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) company. And S&P became 
merged with the publisher McGraw Hill in the 1960s. The third biggest rating 
agency, Fitch, was created in 1924.  
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These three firms nowadays continue having most of the market share of the 
rating sector, about 95%, and they are widening their scope by delivering 
ratings of a broad range of products. Moody’s and S&P, the biggest ones, retain 
more than the 80% of rating market share (White 2010). These three CRAs 
obtained in the past their revenues through selling their ratings of 
creditworthiness to investors.  
 
The judgments or opinions expressed by these agencies are in forms of ratings 
indicated by a letter grade, from “investment grade” bonds to “junk bonds”: 
AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, and so on, with also symbols as pluses and minuses to 
achieve higher level of detail of the tranches. They also published and outlooks 
called “watchlists” that focus on short time horizon and are strong predictors of 
rating changes (Hill et al. 2010). These perspectives analyses also have a 
monitoring function of issuers’ performance, through inducing them to take 
corrective actions in order to avert rating downgrades (Boot et al. 2006).  
 
In 1934 it was created “The Securities and Exchange Commission” (SEC) in the 
United States, following the demands for encouraging banks to invest in safe 
bonds and requiring to corporations to issue standardized financial statements 
(U.S. SEC 1934).2 The set of regulations imposed by this commission allowed 
banks only to invest in “investment grade” products, and prohibited banks 
from buying “speculative investment securities”, which are bonds that were 
rated below the BBB grade or equivalent. The banks were forced to use the 
judgments of the recognized rating manuals -that were Standard, Poor’s, 
Moody’s and Fitch-. By this new regulation, the judgments of the independent 
CRAs became fixed by law. Before these changes take place, many buyers and 
banks had bought speculative low rated bonds, and the reminding of the Crash 
of 1929 was still present. After this event, several ratings were downgraded and 
investors became especially concerned about the quality of the bond and the 
risk of default of it, increasing the CRAs reputation. The prohibition of buying 
low-rated bonds by banks, created incentives for issuers to obtain a good credit 
rating (above the minimum BBB) and CRAs became more important and 
valuable. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 SEC’s net capital rule (Rule 15c3-1 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
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Chart 1: Rating grades of Standard & Poor’s (S&P), Fitch and Moody’s. At left, a short description 
interpreting the ranking. At centre, the letter system grade and equivalencies among agencies. At right, 
the meaning of the ranking letter system. Data source S&P and Moody’s website and own design 
 
1.3.2 Past Performance 
 
The initial performance of the CRAs in the United States had been assessed by a 
study of the “National Bureau of Economic Research” conducted by W. 
Braddock Hickman and published in 1958 (Hickman 1958). Hickman’s data 
include the largest corporate bond issued in United States from 1900 to 1943. 
The author analysed the bond market in terms of three different sources of 
creditworthiness information used by investors at that time. The first one was a 
composite average of the four independent agency ratings of that moment 
(Moody’s, Standard Statistics, Poor’s and Fitch). The second was the ratings of 
the “legal investments lists for saving banks”, adopted by the regulatory 
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authorities of several American states. And the third source of information 
came from a market-rating given by the yield spread of a particular bond over 
the lowest yield spread of a corporate bond with the same maturity.  The main 
results were that during the first half of the twentieth century the rating 
agencies did a proper job in assessing the quality of the bonds. The author 
concluded that the ratings provided good information to investors, and this 
information clearly reflected the default rate of the bonds. But Hickman also 
found that the other sources of information, legal lists and market ratings, also 
estimated properly the possibility of default. Hickman concluded that the 
similar results achieved by the three different sources of creditworthiness were 
due to the fact that their assessments have been created using almost the same 
kind of information. At that time, the reputation of CRAs was growing and the 
changes in regulations promoted by “The Securities and Exchange 
Commission” consolidate their position as official institutions. 
 
1.3.3 Present Performance 
 
In the first half of the twentieth century the revenues obtained by CRAs 
generally came from selling the agency reports to the investors instead of the 
bond-issuers. This model of “investor pays” was the one established by John 
Moody in 1909. But the agencies change their business model in the early 1970s 
by switching to an “issuer pays” model, whereas the entity that issues the bond 
is the same that pays to the rating firm in concept of bond rating. Among the 
reasons that led to that change it is included the spread of photocopy machine 
and fax. Rating firms were discouraged of selling their rates to the investors, as 
their manuals could be widespread thanks to these machines. This change in 
the earning model creates a potential conflict of interests between the payer and 
the agency, because the one that ask for the rating is the same that pays for it. 
Moreover, the issuer could choose to be evaluated by another rating agency, 
creating incentives to rate upward the bond to keep the issuer happy and to 
avoid loosing costumers (White 2009). The second big change in the rating 
business was due to new regulations. In the 1930s the “The Securities and 
Exchange Commission” gave to the agencies a regulatory role in the bond 
market, and in 1975 consolidated still more the power of the existing ones by 
creating the “Nationally Recognized Statistical Ratings Organizations.” 
8 
!
(NRSROs). Only the ratings emitted by these organizations were valid for the 
determination of the broker-dealers capital requirements (reviewed in White 
2010). The Commission designated, apart from the three big agencies, four more 
firms3 that by the end of 2000 were finally merged to the original three ones. 
The “Securities and Exchange Commission” did not establish any formal 
criteria or methodology to assign the category of NRSROs, designating the 
seventh mentioned and refusing others without explanation, generating 
barriers to entry into this sector. The Basel II framework (2004),4 have fixed 
some rules about banks capital requirements. An external credit assessment 
must be done by a CRA that are recognised by the official authorities. The 
implementation of this directive have led to the European Parliament and the 
Council of the European Union to approve a new European regulation on credit 
agencies, in September 2009.5 Therefore, the different legal systems in United 
States and the European Union have create an institutional legal role for the 
CRAs (reviewed in Haan and Amtenbrink  2011). 
 
Growth and expansion of CRAs 
The great expansion, both in terms of number of bonds rated as employees, 
took place from 1980s to onwards. This increase reflects the growth of the 
business of credit ratings. By 1980 S&P had 30 professional in its industrial 
group, whereas nowadays present thousands of analysts (Partnoy 2002). 
Meanwhile, Moody’s has expanded his staff at similar rate. The number of 
rated issued has increased also in a similar way. Whereas in 1975 Moody’s rated 
600 new bonds, 25 years later, in 2000, Moody’s rates 20,000 public and private 
issuers in the United States and a thousand more from non United States 
issuers, both sovereign states and corporate bonds. S&P rated fewer in each 
category. In 2000, Moody’s rated $5 trillion worth of securities and S&P rated $2 
trillion. Ninety-five per cent of the CRAs revenues came from the payments of 
the issuers (Partnoy 2002). More recent data still reinforce their growth 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 The “Security and Exchange Comission” bestowed the NRSRO designation on Duff & Phelps 
in 1982; on McCarthy, Cristanti & Maffei in 1983; on IBCA in 1991; and on Thomson Bank 
Watch in 1992 
4 Basel II is the second of the Basel Accords, which are recommendations on banking laws and 
regulations issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The purpose of Basel II 
(published in June 2004) was to create an international standard that banking regulators can use 
when creating regulations about how much capital banks need to put aside to guard against the 
types of financial and operational risks that banks could face. 
5 Regulation (EC) 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of Credit Rating 
Agencies (O.J. 2009, L 302/1). 
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perspective. The present low interest rates have prompted a surge in bond 
issuance. At the end of 2013 Moody’s have issued 900,000 bonds and Moody’s 
near 1,1 million (Einhorn 2015). 
 
Impact of CRAs decisions on global markets 
The influential power of CRAs over the market has been shown by multiple 
studies. Several authors have studied the relationship between bond-rating 
changes and financial market reaction and vice versa. According to some 
authors, when a CRA change its rating on a bond, the market subsequently 
reacts (Jewell and Livingston 1999; Creighton et al. 2007). But this change could 
be provoked by the implicit regulatory status that the ratings have. Other 
empirical studies suggested that it is the market that alerts the CRAs, and the 
alarm that cause the agencies rating downgrade is the decline in value and 
quality of bonds shown by the expansion of yield spreads (Kliger and Sarig 
2000; Galil 2003).  Also the CRAs ranks influence each others decisions. A recent 
study showed that during pre-crisis period the most part of banks ratings 
across the different agencies occurred independently. But that was not the case 
during the crisis period (2008-2013), whereas there was a high probability that a 
bank rating that has been downgraded by a CRA could experience a notch 
downgrade by another CRA. This could be due to the CRA practices which 
similar and conservative (Alsakka 2014). 
  
Inaccuracy of ratings in last decade 
In November 2001, the energy corporation Enron declared bankruptcy. This 
firm was rated by the three CRAs with the category of “investment grade” until 
five days before the company bankrupted. This situation led to the United 
States congress to ask to the “Securities and Exchange Commission”, and to the 
rating agencies, why they were so slow in recognizing the weak financial 
condition of Enron. Some months later, a similar situation happened with the 
telecommunications firm WorldCom. The lateness in reaction have been 
repeated until more recent days, where the three rating agencies maintained the 
“investment grade” ratings on Lehman Brothers’ company the same day that 
this bank declared bankruptcy, in September 2008. The credit rating agencies 
defend themselves by stating that they provide a long-term perspective-
through-the-cycle rather than providing short-term assessments (Löffler 2004). 
10 
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They excused themselves stating that under their assumptions, the agencies 
judgements will present always a delay in the assessment of changes within the 
shape of a cycle; as they need time to test if the cycle is reversible or if it is the 
beginning of a sustained improve or decline. 
 
 
Chart 2: Time line with important events related with CRAs. This figure contains a line that represents a 
time frame in which are represented the most significant events related with CRAs. Own design 
 
1.4 Commercial banking sector 
 
Banks, financial entities and insurance companies represents the biggest sector 
of all the corporate bonds that agencies rates. The financial and banking sector 
is highly dependent in CRAs decisions, and then, the rating judgements have 
clear repercussions in the whole banking system. Moreover, there is an official 
recognition of the ratings provided by NRSROs to compute the regulatory 
capital requirements for commercial banks. And the banks have been in the 
epicentre of the recent financial crisis. New financial instruments have been 
created around the banking sector. Among them, the role of Collateralized Debt 
Obligations (CDOs) has been of special interest.6 Securitized instruments, like 
the CDOs have been involved in the housing market boom as well as affected 
the banking sector. This happened because most of these instruments were 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 CDOs are a structured financial product that pools together cash flow-generating assets and 
repackages this asset pool into discrete tranches that can be sold to investors. 
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rated AAA before the crisis, in 2007. However, in mid-2007, the rating of the 
CDOs has been downgraded after experiencing large losses (Lucchetti 2008). 
The inaccuracy of some of the rates over nearly bankrupted corporations 
emitted by the CRAs and their role during financial crisis has raised questions 
about their performance. Given the central role of banking sector, and the 
precedent problems related with rating assignations, we are going to study the 
bank rating methodology as a paradigmatic example. 
 
2.  How is the rating assigned? The case of bank sector 
 
2.1 Introduction and scope of the criteria 
 
In this second section of the manuscript, we are going to analyze the different 
methodological aspects that rating agencies take into account when they assign 
their ratings for banks. We decide get in depth in the bank sector given the role 
they play in economies, not only as the most important issuers, but also as a 
keystone for the overall system stability. 
In order to analyze the different aspects agencies consider, we have studied in 
depth the way that the two most important agencies (in market share terms) 
organize they procedures: Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s. Moreover, the 
mentioned agencies are the ones which facilitate free access for their full 
rating’s procedures. In the case of Fitch, the access to this information is limited 
to a concrete kind of membership. For the other two, the creation of a user in 
their website, with an easy procedure, is enough to get full access to their 
different rating methodologies. And that is exactly what we started doing.  One 
of the problems was to determine what procedures were the correct to analyze. 
This is due to the fact that agencies assign a rating for every different debt 
product that a certain society has issued. This translated into that, for every 
bank, we could find a different specific methodology for every product. 
Fortunately, both agencies specify a procedure for assigning ratings to banks, as 
a “long term issuer” (or “senior debt long term issuer”). They define the scope 
for these criteria as ratings on retail, commercial, and corporate and investment 
credit institutions (banks). Bank’s definition includes the larger broker-dealers, 
mortgage lenders, trust banks, credit unions, etc.  
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Chart 3: Evolution of the Moody’s rates for four global banks (Santander, Bank of America, Citigroup 
and Deustche Bank) in the last twenty years period. Data source: Moody’s investor service website and 
own design 
 
They rate the expected loss on instruments issued, in general, ranging from the 
simple bank deposits to the preferred stock. The methodology also includes the 
default probability of certain senior contractual obligations. We have observed 
that both agencies consider, approximately, the same aspects. However, they 
often use different names for them and combine them in a different procedure. 
Despite of this, it is possible to explain them jointly, given that conceptually 
they look for the same features.7  
The bases are the assessment of bank’s intrinsic strength combined with the 
possible external support. Both, intrinsic strength and external support consider 
different elements. The intrinsic part consider macro-elements and, obviously, 
specific aspects of the bank. The external support considerations include the 
government support in addition to the support offered by the other members of 
each bank group.  
 The complete detail for the methodology is composed by hundreds of pages 
and dozens of tables. Thus, along the rest of the section, we will try to briefly 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 We have checked to find concepts that are very similar in their analysis and then we have 
selected the details form the methodology that, in every case, defines better the concept.  
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resume the more salient characteristics of every aspect they consider on these 
procedures. In this regard, we try to maintain the same structure that they use 
and finally we introduce some insights about these factors’ combination. We 
will not go into the different details, because usually are too complex, and the 
conceptual understanding provides enough information for our analysis in this 
piece of work.  
 
2.2 Stand Alone Credit Profile Assessment (SACP / BCA) 
 
This first group of factors consider the bank’s capacity of paying its debts by 
itself, without further external support. It is composed by a combination of the 
macro factors’ analysis and the bank’s specific factors. 
 
2.2.1 Macro Analysis (BICRA) 
 
The first perspective that agencies consider when they analyze the bank’s issuer 
strength is its macroeconomic environment. Supported by many academic 
studies, and according to their experience, they consider that there are some 
macro factors that are predictive of a bank to fail.  They divide this analysis in 
two parts: The first part considers the macro-economic risks for the whole 
economy, in the concrete bank’s country. The second takes into account only the 
specific characteristics and situation of the banking sector in its country.  
 
2.2.1.1 Economic Risk (Economic Resilience) 
 
Agencies assign a risk score to the country where the bank operates, based in 
macro-factors, trying to reflect the bank's underlying economic risks. When a 
bank operates in more than one country then the score is calculated as a 
weighted average of the different countries risk score. What they try to evaluate 
in this section is the potential for adverse economic developments and the 
overall country’s economy strength. So, it takes into account the stability and 
structure of a country's economy, its potential imbalances, its economic policy 
tendencies, and the credit risk characteristics of the economic participants of 
this economy (households and enterprises). Actually, the considerations are 
parallel to the assignment to the country’s risk rating (sovereign rating), but 
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also have significant differences. As for the country’s risk, the three key factors 
are economic strength, institutional strength and susceptibility to event risk.  In 
order to evaluate economic strength, they consider economic stability and hence 
the volatility of the economic cycles in this economy. This is the GDP growth 
and its standard deviation along the last cycles. Inside de institutional strength, 
agencies take into account factors such as integrity of public institutions and the 
legal system’s warranties. Surprisingly, for measuring legal warranties, they 
measured for instance indicators as the length of foreclosure on residential real 
estate. The “susceptibility to event” consideration acts as a sort of catch-all for 
every occurrence that is susceptible to affect the economy. Notice that, even 
being very similar considerations that the ones they use for sovereign ratings, 
the government financial imbalances are not considered specifically for this 
point. Certainly, this factor is secondarily reflected in the GDP performance, but 
the real reason for not considering this aspect in this section is that it actually 
belongs to the external support analysis.  
 
2.2.1.2 Industry Risk (Banking Country Risk) 
 
For the analysis of the industry risk, agencies consider basically three structural 
features: (a) the institutional framework for banking industries, that is the 
quality and effectiveness of the specific regulations; (b) the competitive 
dynamics; based on competitive landscape, existing financial products and 
practices and the role of other nonbank financial institutions; and (c) the role of 
government or central banks as funding institutions for this economy. They 
assign an important role to the degree of use of complex financial products, 
such as derivatives, in the overall sector. Unlike in the case of the economic risk 
assessment, when a bank operates in different countries this factor is only 
considered for the home regulatory framework and industry, and not as a 
weighted average of the different countries where the banks operates. This 
makes sense, given that, when a bank operates in a country with different 
regulations, the most common procedure is to create a different filial of the 
corporation. 
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2.2.2 Bank Specific Factors (Financial Profile) 
 
The second part of the “stand-alone” specific profile analysis is carried out in a 
microeconomic-basis, looking only for those aspects that reflect the specific 
situation of the bank. In this part of the analysis, the considered factors can be 
classified in four groups: asset risk, capital and profitability, funding structure 
and qualitative factors. 
 
2.2.2.1 Asset Risk (Risk Position) 
 
In this first parameter, agencies try to measure the degree of risk in the bank’s 
asset portfolio. They look for changes in exposure in terms of both banking and 
trading. They also consider the assets volume and its evolution, searching for 
instance for rapid expansions, or the opposite. In some way, it is an attempt to 
monitor the portfolio and the direction of its movements in the risk spectrum. 
Logically, a change in the risk policy of this asset management becomes one of 
the most powerful indicators of the banks risk. They also analyze risk 
concentrations or diversification. Agencies check whether the bank concentrates 
its exposure to a certain country or region, a certain type of individual debtors, 
institutions or sectors, asset class, underlying asset or even a certain risk type 
shared by different debtors or products. The CRAs consider risk concentrations 
of any type as a primary reason for bank failures.  Another factor to study, 
when analyzing the asset risk, is its complexity. A greater scale of the assets 
volume could be good in facilitating diversification, but also could increase the 
asset management complexity in terms of products to consider, business lines, 
and organizational structure for managing them. This is also considered 
dangerous by agencies. This complexity could appear when the weight for 
complex products (e.g. derivatives, securitizations or structured credit), is (a) 
too big; or (b) when the transparency in underlying positions is limited; (c) 
when the dependence on complex mathematical models is extreme or with 
important weight in tail risk portfolios.8 The opposite of this complex asset risk 
structure is the presentation of transparent and straightforward risks, which are 
well-understood and well-managed. Complexity could come by the nature of 
the asset or by the way they are combined (using complex strategies beyond the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 “Tail risk portfolio” contains risk with a low probability of occurrence but high loss severity. 
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mere diversification). When the trading activity is especially important for the 
bank’s portfolio it may result in a weak score for this factor, especially when the 
risk analysis relies solely on Value-at-risk (it is considered an incomplete 
perspective by CRAs). Finally, it is interesting to know that this kind of assets’ 
risk consideration does not cover specifically interest rates and currency risk, 
beyond the considerations in this regard in the diversification analysis. 
Agencies do not detail the reasons, but our interpretation of this is that those 
risks are inherent to the bond itself as financial product; if agencies consider it 
as a bank’s asset portfolio risk, then the result would be to consider it twice.     
 
2.2.2.2 Capital and Profitability (Capital and Earnings) 
 
For the capital and profitability considerations agencies take into account four 
aspects: 
The first is that the bank must fulfill all the regulatory requirements (this is 
Basel’s rules and other national laws). Logically, when a bank operates with its 
capital too close to the minimum local regulatory requirements it receives a low 
score in this regard.  The second point to consider is a projection for the bank’s 
risk adjusted capital level ratio (RAC).9 For instance, a RAC equal to 12% is 
considered enough for a bank operating in a developed country. This ratio 
objective is to compare a bank's capital to its risk-weighted assets (RWA). This 
represents a forward-looking evaluation of a bank's ability to rebuild capital 
through its retained earnings. To calculate the RWA of a bank, specific risk 
weights are applied to the bank's different assets. Then, they evaluate if this 
RAC projection is consistent enough with the capital sustainability ratio.10 The 
third step is to analyze the quality of capital and earning. A high quality of 
capital and earnings is associated to aspects as: bank’s core capital representing 
a high percentage (around 85%) of the bank’s total adjusted capital; an investor 
base more supportive of strong capital (investors with lower dividends 
expectations); the capability of selling attractive assets without damaging 
competitive position (equivalent for instance to 10% of total assets); having 
substantial economic capital in reserves; the ratio net-interest-income/total-
revenue is high enough; the ratio between fees-and-commissions/total-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 This criterion is well defined in the S&P methodology and this is the one described here. 
10 This is, in plain words, if the forecast of the future capital ratio makes the capital of the bank 
sustainable or if this must be higher. 
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revenues is high enough; etc. This capital and earnings strength is studied 
through comparison with other banks of a similar economic risk score. Finally, 
the fourth aspect to consider is earnings capacity. This is based in the use of 
estimations of future earnings. This is basically done using estimations for 
operating incomes and losses for a certain future period (e.g. 3 years or more) 
and applying a buffer to the calculations. 
 
2.2.2.3 Funding Structure (Funding and Liquidity) 
 
This part of the analysis combines two aspects: 
First, compares the strength of the bank’s funding mix with the domestic 
industry average. This strength is assessed by reviewing the mixture of bank’s 
liabilities (deposits, interbank loans, and borrowing in capital markets, etc.). 
The agencies evaluate these aspects based on financial ratios such as loan-to-
deposit ratio, long-term funding ratio, or also reliance on short-term wholesale 
funding. When bank’s real data is not available in this regard, agencies need to 
estimate it. 
The second aspect is to take into consideration the bank’s capability to manage 
its liquidity needs in case of adverse conditions, or even its survival in a lengthy 
period in such conditions. In a certain manner this is a consideration about the 
bank’s degree of maturity transformation. The main points are the bank’s 
dependence of central bank’s liquidity facilities and bank’s access to other 
possible liquidity sources. The higher the dependence from monetary 
authorities, the weaker the bank is considered. This analysis combines both 
absolute and relative terms comparisons. The common ratios used to analyze 
liquidity are liquid-assets/wholesale-funding and liquid-assets/core-deposits. 
 
2.2.2.4 Qualitative Factors (Business Position) 
 
Finally, in the analysis of the bank specific factors, agencies include aspects that 
are more difficult to measure, hence to evaluate. Sometimes this is called 
“business position”, and in others are simply subjective extra evaluations that 
are added to the more “numerical” factors previously described. These factors 
include, for instance, a bank's franchise “stability” (stability of revenue, and 
customer base, etc.); the diversification of business activities (and the 
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contribution of every business line to the total revenue) or the quality of 
management, understood as the quality of the corporate governance and 
strategy (strategic positioning, operational effectiveness, financial management, 
etc.). Some of these qualitative factors interact; reinforcing or sometimes 
weakening each other’s effect, so, the only way in which makes sense to 
consider these factors is combining them. 
 
2.3 Support Analysis 
 
As we have explained before, at the same time that the stand-alone capacity of 
the bank is analyzed, the hypothetical external help is also evaluated. This 
second part of the analysis is carried out through two perspectives: the support 
from the bank’s affiliates and the support proceeding from the public entities. 
Agencies consider that a bank usually receives help from either its affiliates or 
government, not both at the same time. So, only the strongest of both support’s 
considerations will influence the bank’s rating. 
 
2.3.1 Affiliate (group) support 
 
When agencies consider the possibility of the bank receiving external support 
from its affiliates they look for the following aspects: 
First, the relationship between the bank and its affiliates, which basically 
comprehends: the control relation between them, the brand’s considerations, 
the possible supports imposed by regulations, their geographic interrelation, 
the existence of documented previous support, the strategic fit between the 
companies and their possible financial links. Second, the stand-alone capacity of 
the affiliates. This aspect is the most restrictive one, and could have even 
negative connotations if the affiliate is susceptible of needing help. And finally, 
the study of the possible correlation between their risks, considering their 
respective operating environments. This support is considered even when the 
affiliate is not a financial entity, for example an insurance company. In those 
cases, agencies take in special consideration the senior unsecured debt rating for 
this company, when available, and the other considerations relative to the two 
companies’ relationship. 
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2.3.2 Government Support 
 
The analysis of the hypothetic support of the government is highly related to 
the sovereign creditworthiness. It means that one affect each other positive or 
negatively. As in the case of Ireland in 2010, it is possible that the government 
decides to support a bank even if it negatively affects its sovereign rating. Also, 
there is a capital differentiation when the bank is a government-related 
institution, which plays a concrete role in public policy, or a government has 
some kind of strategic long-term ownership in bank’s capital. In these special 
cases, the whole rating procedure is different and based in very similar criteria 
to the one used for sovereign rating assessment. For the rest of banks, the 
strength of the link between the bank and the government is capital for 
determining the likelihood of the support. The two most important factors 
considered are: a) if the bank is considered of “systemic importance”; and b), 
the government's tendency (and capacity), based on past behaviour, to provide 
support for private commercial banks. In any case, the uncertainty for this 
support will be always considered higher than for those banks partially owned 
by the government or even higher than for the affiliates support. Agencies 
consider that the government balance sheet constrains may make impossible to 
help a bank relatively large for the country’s economy. It could be also that the 
government changes its supporting attitude, maybe due to a change in the 
governing parties. They could consider different types of support. One is the 
support that a government provides to all financial institutions in regular 
manner (legally established), and another is the direct support that a bank 
provides to a specific bank in crisis, or also additional extraordinary short-term 
support for all banks in a sector’s crisis (which is specifically announced in 
advance by governments). Another important factor considered is the relative 
size of the financial sector for the overall economy, which will determine the 
public body capacity to provide support in a crisis susceptible to affect the 
whole sector. This factor connects with the correlation between the banking 
system strength and the sovereign rating. The stronger the connection, less 
probable the improvement of the bank rating due to hypothetic government 
support. 
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2.4 Factors Combinations Insights and Final Credit Rating 
 
In this last section of the second chapter we will try to resume the main 
characteristics of the agencies’ procedures that are used to combine the different 
aspects described. Notice that every agency has its own methodology, 
weighting more or less every aspect and using different references, names, 
tables, scales, etc., for every factor to consider. The order employed in 
combining the factors is different, and moreover, they use intermediate stages 
at different moments of the process. But the methodology, according to the two 
cases analyzed, has these common traits: 
A first baseline credit assessment is computed combining the macro-
environment profile, the financial profile and adjustments according to 
qualitative aspects. This baseline (or stand-alone) profile is adjusted with the 
information about possible support (from affiliates and government). This is 
organized as a sequential analysis, so the second part is an adjustment of a 
limited number of notches from the first stand-alone rating consideration. 
Usually every factor or sub-factor is evaluated within a certain range, and 
subsequently combined through tables with other related factors also 
previously valuated. Depending on the previously specified determinants for 
every factor, the position of these factors is higher or lower in its possible range. 
Then, the combination in double entry tables allows that those factors that are 
more related could interact between them, enhancing or offsetting each other’s 
effect. Finally, the resulting different evaluations are joined in partial 
scorecards, assigning weights to every factor, and the resulting tables are 
combined and weighted in more general scorecards. A final scorecard 
integrates all of them and provides the final overall view, but not the final rate. 
The resulting rate is then evaluated by a committee, under several criteria that 
could apply some adjustments (notches up or down) over the resulting rate on 
the scorecard. These adjustments are initially suggested (notching guidance) by 
those analysts that have studied the support factors (on simply: those factors 
that entail more subjective valuations), and have some limitations. But, in both 
agencies we have studied, the methodology description states that the final 
decision depends only on the committee criteria and do not have necessarily to 
be limited to any previous indication. This committee freedom is justified in the 
inherent limitations of the mathematical models when they need to adjust to 
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real life circumstances. Among the variables considered by the committee there 
are considerations not strictly applied in the scorecards, such as the rating of a 
bank could not be above the sovereign rate of the country where the bank is 
domiciled, except in very concrete circumstances. Moreover, a subjective 
evaluation of the bank’s failure effects is also introduced and analyzed, 
considering the most likely resolution scenarios and its implications. Through 
this last perspective, the higher the damage of a bankruptcy scenario, the most 
improbable it is considered. Criteria like the last one described, defined 
according to Moody’s by its “degree of simplicity”, are good examples of the 
deficiencies that, under our opinion, this methodology presents.  Probably the 
reader has noticed that many of the employed criteria presents simple 
procedures for analyzing wide-range characteristics, and in addition, the 
collected data are based in estimations or in subjective or relative evaluations. 
All this is hardly dissembled behind the methodology’s complexity. The 
possible consequences of these deficiencies crash with the objective and well-
defined descriptions of their rates. This issue is one important part of the critical 
analysis developed in the third section of this work. 
 
3. The banks’ rating. Methodological weaknesses and institutional strengths 
 
3.1 What happens when they rate the banks? 
 
The methodology applied by these agencies display some weaknesses that are 
noticeable once their methodology is studied. The previous detailed analysis of 
the concrete case of banks led us to describe, according to our criteria, their 
methodology contains at least five weaknesses that affect the reliability of the 
final result. On the other hand, it is comprehensible that these weaknesses are 
entailed in the task itself; given its difficulty, but it does not make them less 
worrying. These weaknesses are differently distributed along the analysis of the 
different factors they take into account, and even sometimes they are combined. 
So, in the factors analyzed we found that the rating process entails: 
 
A. Subjectivity: Sometimes is not possible to conclude or assign a value within 
a range without using subjective factors. For the sake of this work, we consider 
“subjective factors” those that are no possible to quantify numerically (for 
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example the integrity of an institution, the transparency, the attitudes, etc.). In 
some cases, their valuations rely on indexes created by international 
organizations (like World Bank or World Economic Forum). In others cases, 
they simply assign a detailed, but also subjective, combination of sub-factors. 
After the last crisis, the banks’ rating methodologies had been oriented to assign 
higher weight to the role of governments and central banks.11 This change was 
made in order to adapt the methodology to the new reality, however, we think 
it increased the exposure to subjectivity. 
 
B. Relativity: Often, even having obtained a numerical value, it is not possible 
to be evaluated by itself. This means that does not exist an objective absolute 
value to compare in order to know if this is a high or a low value. It means that 
this numerical value, in order to make sense, needs to be compared with the 
equivalent value of other banks. Thus, the only possibility is to compare 
between values and assume that being above the average must be indicative 
that the value is high enough. This actually happens when they try to evaluate 
factors like as the degree of derivatives usage or the dependence on central 
bank’s liquidity. Even being possible to calculate a ratio, it is not possible to 
know if this is high or low without comparing with other entities. Notice that 
the reference values and the average values of these ratios could be evolving 
along time, in the whole global banking sector. So, as they do, the only 
possibility to put a value within a range is comparing among them. The 
existence of this “weakness” is emphasized by the agencies themselves, in the 
sense of note that this is a strong conditioning that they cannot avoid, neither 
hide. 
 
C. Simplicity in procedure: Some factors, especially those related to 
“management performance” are not necessarily subjective to evaluate. Maybe it 
is possible to establish if their performance is good or bad objectively, in the 
basis of a numerical results combination or/and evaluating other aspects. 
However, when the method could combine a huge set of variables with 
different combinatorial possibilities, the procedure became subjective, which 
leads to an oversimplification. That is what “simplicity in procedure” means in 
this text: when, even being possible to use numerical data, there is no way to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 This fact is stressed by Packer and Tarashev (2011), who followed the evolution of changes in 
the methodology throughout the crisis. 
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evaluate it in an objective manner –each combination will end in different 
results. Hence, it must be done intuitively and it drives to use exceedingly 
“simple” procedures in assigning how many notches up or down it must be in a 
certain range.12  
 
D. Need of forecasting: The rating procedure itself, as a whole, is a forecast. But 
there are some specific aspects in the methodology that deeply rely on specific 
future values or behaviors estimations. In the case of numerical values it could 
happen when, for example, they analyze their projections of the risk-adjusted 
capital or in the estimation of future earnings. On the other hand, with 
behaviors it occurs when they study the possibility of political changes, which 
could affect to government support for banks. Forecasting is notably risky in 
the case of banks, because, as Packer and Tarashev explain, their earnings 
performance is highly volatile. One of the causes of that is their high leverage, 
roughly five times that of other sectors firms’ over the past several decades. 
This fact is also reflected in the consistently higher volatility of returns on 
banks’ stocks. 
 
E. Use of estimated data: Sometimes the information needed to evaluate a 
factor exists, but is not available for agencies. Possibly, the banks are not ought 
to make it public; and in addition, they could be interested in hiding the true 
values or even signaling the opposite to reality. In these circumstances, agencies 
make their estimations. Notice that this is different from forecast, because the 
real data exists, and it is susceptible to be deduced by available data. The factors 
affected by this weakness are, for instance, those related with derivatives and 
other portfolio strategies. In these cases, it would not make sense that the bank, 
neither other investor, were interested in making public all the data. However, 
it is crucial information in order to evaluate the overall risk situation. In this 
regard, Morgan (2002) claimed a higher opacity level in banks and insurance 
companies, and related it with the level of disagreement between the agencies.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 We have distinguished between those cases in which the subjectivity is absolute (there are no 
numerical values to analyze) which is included in “weakness A”, and when subjectivity is in the 
manner the numerical values are considered, “weakness C” (what we decided to call 
“simplicity in procedure” as an euphemism that means that combining without the possibility 
of using a true objective criteria). 
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Using data between 1983 and 1993, the author showed that the only companies 
with higher level of disagreement were the insurance companies (strongly 
linked to banks). He argued that banks are inherently more opaque than other 
types of firms, because of the kind of assets they use, especially loans and 
trading assets, the risks of which are harder to observe or easier to change. He 
also relates this opacity to their higher leverage, and their probable interest to 
let the competitors know as less as possible about it. According to this author, 
fixed assets -more difficult to conceal- tend to reduce disagreement between the 
raters, but given their business nature, such assets are lower at banks than in 
other firms.  
 
If we accept the existence of all these weaknesses, it is easy to agree that 
agencies’ problems increase when more than one of these weaknesses are 
combined in a concrete part of the analysis. If the presence of a single factor is 
negative for the conclusions’ reliability, some of them in combination could 
make that the evaluation get close to be like a wheel of fortune result.  
 
In the following table (Figure 4) we have tried to resume the weaknesses that, 
according to the methodologies descriptions studied and following our 
personal criterion, are present in each factor analyzed in the banks’ rating 
methodology.  In this regard, our analysis is based only in those more salient 
aspects of the methodology, those we have selected and introduced in section 
two.  
 
We are conscious that, even having analyzed the existing information for every 
point, our weaknesses’ assignation also relies partially in subjective aspects that 
we have considered along our interpretation of the methodology of the CRAs. 
Therefore it should be taken as a graphical summary of our consensual opinion 
about the presence of every weakness in each analyzed aspect. Thus, the table 
presented pretends to be an intuitive example of how these weaknesses are 
present in, more or less, the major part of the process. 
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Chart 4: Weaknesses in banks’ rating analyzed factors. Informational source: based on S&P and Moody’s 
Investor Service. Own elaboration and design. 
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Notice that when one factor is evaluated and is used in a scorecard (or in a 
double entry table), the result of the whole scorecard relies in the weaknesses of 
this factor And when a scorecard includes factors that entail different 
weaknesses, the final score assigned is polluted by all of them. If we look at the 
whole process with a wide perspective, the effect is like a general exercise of 
reductionism. The exercise consists in decompounding the evaluation into 
many small subsets of imperfectly related information, and trying to construct a 
rational big picture with it. Then, the great difficulties entailed on it could be 
hided in small weaknesses, which could be seen as negligible. After all, it 
apparently seems that every weakness only affects a small part. In our opinion, 
it is evident that agencies are conscious of their weakness in this regard, 
especially after the subprime “general failure”; and they are also making efforts 
to enhance the transparency of bank ratings methodology and the role they 
assign to the official support. This has resulted in generalized downgrades, 
especially of European and American banks, and increased agreement between 
agencies about banks’ overall level of creditworthiness. One of the main 
differences in the new procedures they set up is to consider a greater 
dependence on public institutions support than in the methods they used in the 
past. However, as we have previously commented, this does not produce 
necessarily a much better result. As Packer and Tarashev (2011) wrote, ratings 
are only opinions about the creditworthiness of a rated entity, which combine 
always both ingredients: quantitative assessments of credit risk and the final 
decision of the “expert” judgment of the ratings committees. Therefore, “no 
rating can be unequivocally explained by a particular set of data inputs and 
formal rules”. In the comparison that these authors made between the ratings 
and the posterior needed help (commented in the introduction), they found that 
some other market indicators much more simple than the rates, correlate much 
better than these.13 On the other hand, different literature has proposed and 
discussed many model-based measures, which at least would allow 
standardizing and increase the implication of the scientific community in this 
issue (Borio and Drehmann 2009; Tarashev 2008). This kind of literature try to 
exploit some regularity observed with market data and banks performance. The 
problem is that often these methods are too much data-intensive and, given its 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 They pointed, for instance, Tier 1 capital ratios. These correlated negatively, and much more, 
with the provided government help. 
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complexity, very difficult to communicate even for the specialized investors. In 
other cases these are not “complete” models, and are only based in part of the 
analysis (systemic risk, for instance) (Drehmann and Tarashev 2011). At this 
point, it seems natural to wonder if it makes sense to assign rates to the banks, 
or, on contrary, it is more realistic to rely on other criteria. Others authors have 
reached similar conclusions and have stressed that CRAs present some other 
methodological problems. Based on a study of CDOs issued from 1997 to 2007, 
researchers have found that the ratings have a high degree of subjectivity, 
which in this case was translated in upward adjustments in the pre-crisis period 
(Griffin and Tang 2012). They attributed this subjectivity to fact to that top 
rating agencies have made their process more qualitative, instead of 
quantitative. Also, they stated that CRAs did not disclose all the details on how 
they rated past or current bonds. 
 
3.2 Other non-methodological flaws of rating system 
 
Methodology is probably not the greater problem associated with CRAs and the 
rating market. Some academics have pinpointed other flaws that are present in 
the system of rating by the external CRAs. Even some academics have proposed 
several alternatives.14 In this subsection we have tried to summarize some of 
non-methodological flaws of rating system. The reader will notice that some of 
them are rooted in the historical evolution of the sector and the consequences 
from past actions.  
 
Less reputation concern 
Some of the concerns about CRAs are related with the loss of dependence on 
their reputational capital. By reputational capital some authors refer to the 
reputation that is acquired over the time based on previous behaviour; where 
investors relies on past performance and hold higher trust to predictable good 
performance. Historical view suggests that reputational capital has been one of 
the main drivers of CRAs performance (reviewed by Sylla 2002). However, 
some authors disagree with this traditional perspective (Mathis et al. 2009). 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 For instance, one alternative is the CRAs replacement by credit spread-dependent regulation 
(Partnoy 2002). This author stated that credit spreads incorporate the information contained in 
the rates delivered by the agencies, and moreover suppressed the regulatory licenses that 
control the Rating-market.  
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Mathis and co-authors created a model showing that reputation is only 
significant when a sufficient large fraction of the income come from other 
sources different from the rating of complex products. Assigning rating for 
complex products, given its nature, the reputation is less compromised than in 
others. Therefore, according to these authors opinion, under current conditions 
it seems that CRAs could exert their power without the need of preserving their 
reputational capital.15 
 
Market power 
 Other problems found are those related with the market power exerted by the 
“oligopoly structure” that the three big rating agencies have (Blaurock 2007). 
These agencies have a regulatory role assigned by the governmental 
institutions. The market dominance also implies that the only benchmark is the 
comparison among them. The creditworthiness ratings published by the CRAs 
are protected by the force of law, and the firms depend on their judgements for 
acceding to credit. Partnoy has described this role as “regulatory licenses” 
(Partnoy 2002). The “regulatory licenses” are granted as a property rights to the 
agencies. Moreover, there are strong barriers to entry due to their need of being 
officially recognized as NRSROs. Furthermore, the market has other deterrence 
to entry, as the minimum reputation required itself. This lack of competition 
creates disincentives to generate accurate ratings (Blaurock 2007).  
 
Delay in the response 
CRAs also have been criticized by the problems related with delay in 
downgrading ratings in nearly failed corporations16. They have been criticised 
for responding late in adjusting ratings, as happened in Lehman Brothers’ case. 
As we have commented above, agencies conclusions often depend on a long 
term perspective-through-the-cycle analysis (Löffler 2004). Their opinions, as 
agencies argue, will always present a delay in assessing changes, given its 
dependence of the cycle. Furthermore, this effect is reinforced given that the 
CRAs usually seem to act in a coordinate way, they up or down-grade (or 
remain unchanged) the bonds rating at similar time frame. Alsakka and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 For instance, Moody’s income from rating complex products increased from one fourth to 
almost one half from 2000 to 2006 (Mathis et al. 2009). 
16 See Financial Stability Board report (2010) 
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Gwilym (2010) described that the CRAs apparently coordinate their 
movements. 
 
Income model 
One of the main weaknesses discussed by different authors are the negative 
incentives created by the “issuers-pays” business model. The business model by 
which CRAs obtain their revenues creates partly irreconcilable incentives 
(Pagano and Volpin 2010). The CRAs are paid by the issuers of financial 
products and the agencies could be tempted to overstate the creditworthiness of 
their products to maintain their customers. Again, their apparently coordinated 
rating evaluations seem to be a consequence of this income model, in case of 
general rating upgrade, the fractious agency -that do not upgrade- is 
threatening its market share. 
 
The proliferation of rating-driven transactions 
The importance of receiving good ratings has resulted in an increasing number 
of rating-driven transactions (Partnoy 1999). This fact suggests that issuers are 
engaging on transactions to obtain better ratings based on factors that are not 
related with the improvement of credit quality. Besides, the new financial 
instruments like credit derivatives, have generated new opportunities of taking 
profits from positive ratings. Therefore, there may be a double motivation for 
executing rating driven transactions: The first are the benefits for the rated 
company, derived from a rating upgrading. The second is the speculative 
earnings obtained through operations based on an expected rating movement 
and hence a bond yields movement.  
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
Although all the aforementioned methodological flaws and market-power 
disequilibria that the CRAs exhibits, there are important benefits derived from 
the agencies task. The external ratings produced by the CRAs reduce the 
inefficiency caused by the asymmetric information among agents, and also 
reduce the costs of negotiating among the parts. Likewise, the ratings offered by 
agencies provide investors with valuable experts’ information, which turns into 
available professional criteria for all level of investing.  Overall, facts seem to 
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indicate that the mentioned benefits are drivers of their institutional strengths. 
The different authorities at both sides of the Atlantic consider that, 
notwithstanding all the weaknesses of the system, the pros are over the 
disadvantages. The new regulations in Europe and United States are assigning 
more institutional power to the agencies. This situation could just be a heritage 
of the past history, a matter of need or a case of a second-best scenario. Or 
maybe it could be provoked by a combination of these three components. 
 
In this work we have tried to describe a general picture of the role of CRAs, its 
origins and evolution. Specifically, we have addressed some methodological 
weaknesses associated with their ratings, besides other non-methodological 
problems related to the rating system established. We have focused in the 
banking sector but other ratings follow similar methodology. In addition to the 
factors developed in this essay, we are aware that several other aspects matter 
and further research and critical analysis is needed. Along the text, we have 
seen that there is disequilibria between the institutional strength that agencies 
had accumulated along time and the problems that the rating system itself, as 
well as the applied methodology, entails. This is worrying as far as, in our days, 
agencies have an extremely significant power. In 1996, the Pulitzer prized 
journalist Thomas Friedman, in a television interview said “There are two 
superpowers in the world today in my opinion. There’s the United States and there’s 
Moody’s Bond Rating Service. The United States can destroy you by dropping bombs, 
and Moody’s can destroy you by downgrading your bonds. And believe me, it’s not 
clear sometimes who’s more powerful”.  
 
However, we can conclude that no simple solution exists for achieving a proper 
work for this market. The rate, as a result, is influenced by too many different 
determinants and therefore no single perspective is capable of providing a 
satisfying solution for the rating system.   
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